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For over three decades, many changes, often collectively referred to as New Public Management 
(NPM), have been introduced in the public sectors of numerous countries.  These changes are 
often related to the argument that operations should be more modern and business-like, in order 
to facilitate better decision making in, and more appropriate accountability by, public-sector 
bodies.  Words like effectiveness, efficiency, performance and transparency often come to the 
fore when such changes are proposed.  
 Aspects of NPM often include moves from cash-based to accrual-based accounting 
systems in the belief that these will provide more appropriate information for decision makers 
and those to whom accountability is owed, with it frequently being suggested that accrual 
accounting is necessary to underpin wider NPM changes. Indeed, in the UK central government 
this has been implemented under the title of resource accounting and budgeting (RAB). 
Resource accounting extends beyond the cash-based accounting used previously by applying 
accrual principles to public-sector accounting (implemented in full 2001/02). In addition, on the 
management accounting side, a subsequent move to resource (i.e. accrual) budgeting in order to 
make the management accounts align with the external accounts was made (implemented in full 
2003/04). In addition, in 2007 it was announced (commenced 2009) that the financial accounting 
of government departments was to be based on International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) (as adapted for the public sector by H.M. Treasury), rather than International Public 
Sector Accounting Standards. Moreover, the position of accrual accounting was further 
embedded by the production of consolidated Whole of Government Accounts (WGA), with the 
first set of WGA being published in 2011. So, in the UK central government, a fairly detailed, 
sophisticated architecture of accrual accounting has been developed, often going beyond what 
many commercial organisations are expected to follow. But does it help, and, in particular, how 
does it relate to the job politicians do?  
 
 
The UK experience with accrual accounting 
A good accounting system is regarded as both a prerequisite for the discharge of accountability 
(being related to the requirement for an entity to be answerable to outsiders for its conduct and 
responsibilities), and as a support for those charged with decision making within the entity. In 
this latter context, traditional views of accounting typically portray it as a means of providing 
rational decision makers with appropriate information to make informed decisions. Such a 
notion of accounting is based on a view of the organisation, as one with well-defined, clearly-
ordered goals and objectives that are uncompromisingly pursued by decision makers. 
Notwithstanding the validity or otherwise of the above argument, accrual accounting is often 
presented as superior to cash accounting, with it being suggested, among other things, that: cash-
based systems have inbuilt biases against rational capital investment;  accrual accounting enables 
better-informed decisions on the balance between current and capital expenditure; and accrual 
accounting provides a more accurate basis for determining cost. Such views suggest that accrual 
accounting can provide accurate, true, objective information to support rational, objective-focused 
decision making.  
 But who are the decision makers? Key decision makers in a public-sector setting are 
public-sector managers and politicians. Customarily, politicians are viewed as being responsible 
for the development of mission and strategic plans, whereas managers and administrators are 
responsible for the neutral implementation of such plans. However, there is evidence that in 
some modern NPM settings these roles are dynamic and can often overlap (Aberbach and 
Rockman, 2006; Liguori et al., 2012). While some (particularly professional accountants and their 
acolytes) may focus on the technical aspects of the adoption of accrual accounting, it is clear that 
the accrual accounting changes in the UK, and elsewhere, have (or, at least, are meant to have) a 
much wider constitutional influence relating to political control and political decision making 
(Newberry, 2015). Strategies have been formulated, decisions have been made, performance has 
been evaluated and political oversight has been (or at least should have been) exercised, all 
utilising this new crispy, crunchy modern accounting information.   
 Does this pose a problem? Possibly.  First of all, managers and politicians  (and even 
accountants) working in the UK public sector have viewed the changes as unnecessarily 
complex, very difficult to understand and, through overly embracing  commercial models in their 
development, not focussing on key public-sector issues (Heald and Georgiou, 1995; Connolly 
and Hyndman, 2006, 2011; Ezzamel et al., 2007). Moreover, the benefits of applying accrual 
accounting in a public-sector setting have at times been oversold and deliberately undercosted 
(Connolly and Hyndman, 2006; Lapsley et al., 2009). In addition, and particularly focusing on the 
role of politicians, accrual accounting uses very sophisticated ‘expert talk’ which has the potential 
to undermine democratic accountability. This happens when politicians, who cannot, or do not, 
engage with such language, are disadvantaged (or even excluded) from the political decision-
making process (Ezzamel et al., 2005). Indeed, the adoption of IFRS and WGA with respect to 
central government accounting, arguably encouraged on the basis of the (undue?) influence of 
consultancy-service providers and the needs of financial markets, could be viewed as added 
complexity that makes appropriate usage (or usage at all) by politicians (and managers) much less 
likely. These themes are not unique to the UK setting, but have echoes elsewhere, where accrual 
accounting systems have been proposed and/or implemented (for example: Brusca Alijarde, 
1997; Guthrie, 1998; Ter Bogt, 2004; Newberry and Pont-Newby, 2009).  
 
Reflections on the UK experience 
So what lessons can we learn from the UK experience? Undoubtedly, cash-based systems have 
the virtues of simplicity, understandability and objectivity. While they also have weaknesses, in 
particular in relation to providing meaningful cost information in situations where there is 
significant capital consumption required, replacing them with overly complicated accounting 
rules that are difficult to understand (and of questionable benefit to many, or any, in application) 
will be of little help. While accrual accounting in the public sector may be promoted as 
‘progressive’ and ‘fashionable’ in some quarters, little will be gained, and possibly much lost, by 
developing systems that few understand, use and engage with.  
 Therefore, if accrual accounting systems are adopted, the reporting schedules used (and 
the applicable financial reporting standards followed), should be kept as simple as possible. The 
needs (and abilities) of politicians (and other day-to-day users of information) ought to be central 
in system-design decisions; in the language of O’Neill (2006), the information has to be both 
accessible to and assessable by key stakeholders if it is to be useful. The balance between 
simplicity of system and usefulness of information must be weighed carefully, with information 
understandability given the highest priority. The fact must be grasped that disaggregated financial 
statements are likely to be more useful to the majority of users than complex consolidated 
statements. Cost-benefit issues are core to decisions regarding development and implementation 
of systems. The influence of potential providers of new systems and related services (and gurus 
with limited public-sector appreciation) must be controlled, restricted and carefully reflected 
upon. The education and training of managers and politicians who could engage with the new 
information has got to be a priority. As I reflect on the UK experience over almost twenty years, 
I suspect that, if it were to be done again, the manner and extent of the application of accrual-
accounting principles into the UK central government would be very different. Hindsight is such 
a wonderful thing! 
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